Fraud by Abuse of Position and Unlicensed Gangmasters by Collins, Jennifer
                          Collins, J. (2016). Fraud by Abuse of Position and Unlicensed Gangmasters.
Modern Law Review, 79(2), 354-363. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-
2230.12184
Peer reviewed version
Link to published version (if available):
10.1111/1468-2230.12184
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Collins, J. (2016), Fraud by Abuse of Position and
Unlicensed Gangmasters. The Modern Law Review, 79: 354–363, which has been published in final form at doi:
10.1111/1468-2230.12184. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley
Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published








Subject: Criminal law.  Other related subjects: Employment law 
Keywords: Fraud; Fraud by abuse of position; Defendants acting as unlicensed 
gangmasters; Whether case to answer; exploitation 
Legislation: Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004, ss 4, 12; Fraud Act 2006 ss 1, 4. 
Cases: R v Valujevs and another [2014] EWCA Crim 2888; [2015] 3 WLR 109 
 
Abstract: This article analyses the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of the 
fraud by abuse of position offence in R v Valujevs.  Two issues are explored: 
first, the Court’s welcome clarification of the meaning of a relevant 
‘expectation’; second, the inadequacy of the Court’s reasoning in deciding that 
an unlicensed gangmaster ‘is expected to safeguard, or not to act against, the 
financial interests’ of his workers.   
 
Criminal lawyers have long expressed concern about the nebulous scope of 
the fraud offence found in section 1 of the Fraud Act 2006.1  The offence is 
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drafted in inchoate form, penalising three types of dishonest conduct: false 
representations, failures to disclose information, and abuses of positions of 
trust.  It must be shown that a defendant dishonestly engaged in one of these 
forms of conduct, and that he intended, by means of it, to either make a gain 
for himself or another, or to cause loss or the risk of loss to another.  To date 
fraud by false representation has been most commonly charged. 2   But 
clarification of the scope of fraud by abuse of position is long overdue, given 
its astonishing breadth and its perceived role by criminal law commentators as 
a means of penalising exploitation.3   R v Valujevs provided the Court of 
Appeal opportunity to consider both of these issues within the specific context 
of a regulatory scheme applied to gangmasters. 
 
The defendants, Mr Valujevs and Mr Mezals, worked as unlicensed 
gangmasters in Cambridgeshire.  They supplied agricultural work, transport 
and accommodation to individuals who had come to the UK from Latvia and 
Lithuania.  The defendants sought to ensure that the workers were highly 
dependent upon them, with the aims of securing for themselves financial 
bargaining power and opportunity to gain.  The strategy to achieve these aims 
was to create situations where workers were in debt to them.  It was alleged 
that the defendants required workers to take up their offer of accommodation 
                                                        
2 Ministry of Justice, Post-legislative Assessment of the Fraud Act 2006: Memorandum to the Justice 
Select Committee (London 2012) para 13. 
3 See, for instance, A.P. Simester and others, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law: Theory and 
Doctrine (Hart, 2010) 618-619; R. Williams, ‘Cartels in the Criminal Law Landscape’ in C. Beaton-
Wells and A. Ezrachi (eds), Criminalising Cartels: Critical Studies of an International Regulatory 
Movement (Hart, 2011) 300-301. 
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as a condition for obtaining work, thus tying the worker to the defendants.  
‘Grossly excessive’ rent was then charged.  Unable to keep up with inflated 
rent payments, many workers defaulted.  The defendants withheld work until a 
worker was in significant debt.  Then, once work was provided, wages earned 
were withheld or subject to deductions and penalties by the defendants in 
order to recoup for a worker’s financial indebtedness.  Against this backdrop 
of ‘debt bondage’, evidence was presented at trial that both Mr Valujevs and 
Mr Mezals had physically threatened several of their workers.  
 
At first instance, there was no dispute that the defendants could be charged 
with acting as unlicensed gangmasters, contrary to section 12(1) of the 
Gangmasters Licensing Act 2004, and for conspiracy to facilitate the 
commission of breaches of immigration law.  Two key issues were considered 
by the Court of Appeal.  The first was to reexamine Richardson J.’s emphatic 
rejection of a case to answer in relation to fraud by abuse of position.  Was 
the position of unlicensed gangmaster one in which an individual ‘is expected 
to safeguard, or not to act against, the financial interests’ of his workers, as 
required by section 4(1)(a) of the Fraud Act?  The second issue was to clarify 
the meaning of ‘expectation’ in relation to fraud by abuse of position.   
 
Let us first deal with the Court of Appeal’s treatment of the ‘expectation’ issue.  
From whose vantage point is an expectation that an individual will safeguard, 
or will not act against, another person’s financial interests to be judged?  The 
defendant, the potential victim, or the reasonable person?  Valujevs confirms 
that the judge and jury must decide whether a reasonable person would hold 
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such an expectation.4  An objective interpretation is the principled approach.  
An individual ought not to be entitled to claim that another is responsible for 
safeguarding his financial interests, or is responsible for not acting against 
them, if the reasonable person would disagree.  Nor should a defendant be 
able to shirk responsibility if the reasonable person would say he has it.  But 
this discussion only serves to highlight unabated concerns about legal 
certainty and fraud by abuse of position.  It is first for the judge to decide 
whether a reasonable person would say that an individual has an expectation 
‘to safeguard or not to act against’ the financial interests of another person.  
Can judges hope to produce consistency on this key issue?  On the facts of 
Valujevs we see just how ad hoc this judicial assessment can be.  The 
problem of uncertainty is even more pronounced in the fraud by abuse of 
position offence: a defendant must be found to be dishonest (itself an obscure 
concept), and the Ghosh direction hardly produces consistency on this key 
issue.5 
 
Secondly, the Court of Appeal’s judgment focused on whether there was a 
case to answer in relation to fraud by abuse of position.  The trial judge had 
held that fraud by abuse of position was ‘not remotely arguable’ on the basis 
of respect for commercial freedom.6  In Richardson J.’s words: ‘Providers of 
                                                        
4 [2015] 3 WLR 109 at [41]. 
5 As required by Fraud Act 2006, s 4(1)(b).  The Ghosh direction, Ghosh [1982] 1 QB 1053, has been 
influential in the interpretation of dishonesty in the section 1 fraud offence.  This direction requires the 
following assessment: was the defendant’s conduct dishonest according to the ordinary standards of 
reasonable people; and did defendant know he was acting dishonestly according to these standards? 
6 n 4 above at [19]. 
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accommodation and transport are selling commodities on the open market.  
They are not expected to safeguard or not to act against the financial interests 
of those who may purchase their commodities.’7 
 
Nor did the Gangmasters Licensing Authority’s Licensing Standards 2012, 
under which the defendants should have been registered, demand otherwise.  
While the 2012 Licensing Standards require that wages are consistent with 
labour law, for example, they do not require a reasonable or fair rent.8  The 
safeguarding function assigned to a gangmaster was therefore considered by 
Richardson J. to be minimal.  More promising was the line of argument that 
there was a fiduciary relationship because the defendants had accepted the 
wages of workers ‘for the purpose of delivering them to the workers’.9  A 
fiduciary relationship qualifies as a relevant position for the purposes of 
section 4(1)(a).10  The defendants’ deductions from the workers’ wages would 
be a clear case of fraud by abuse of position if the defendants had acted with 
the required dishonesty.11  While the possibility was not expressly rejected by 
the trial judge, it was displaced with a concern that the prosecution had not 
brought a charge of theft for the monies deducted. 
 
                                                        
7 ibid. 
8  On wage standards, see Gangmasters Licensing Authority, Licensing Standards (May 2012) 13 
<http://www.gla.gov.uk/PageFiles/956/Licensing%20Standards%20-%20May%202012.pdf> accessed 
23 September 2015. 
9 n 4 above at [24]. 
10 Law Commission, Fraud, n 1 above, para 7.38 
11 See n 5 above. 
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On first blush this reasoning is surprising.  Identifying whether there is a case 
to answer in relation to fraud by abuse of position is first for the judge to 
determine. 12   Inevitably judicial interpretation as to whether a person 
‘occupies a position in which he is expected to safeguard, or not to act 
against, the financial interests of another person’ will vary.  However, it is well-
known that the Explanatory Notes to sections 1(2)(c) and 4 of the Fraud Act 
drew few limits to the range of possible positions of trust.  The Notes simply 
restate the Law Commission’s explanation of the meaning of ‘position’, found 
in its 2002 Fraud report.13   A fiduciary duty is not necessary in order to 
determine that there is a relevant position; relationships ‘between trustee and 
beneficiary, director and company, professional person and client, agent and 
principal, employee and employer, or between partners’ will suffice. 14   A 
relevant position ‘may arise otherwise, for example within a family, or in the 
context of voluntary work, or in any context where the parties are not at arm’s 
length’.15  Moreover, it is a duty to safeguard, or not to act against, another 
person’s financial interests.  All sorts of individuals may have a duty not to act 
against another person’s financial interests.  This suggests that fraud by 
abuse of position breaches rule of law ideals.16  Clearly it is not acceptable to 
                                                        
12 n 1 above, para 7.38: whether there is a relevant position of trust will be ‘an issue capable of being 
ruled upon by the judge and, if the case goes to the jury, of being the subject of directions’. 
13 ibid para 7.38 
14 ibid. 
15 ibid. 
16  According to the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights, Legislative Scrutiny: Sixth 
Progress Report, Fourteenth Report of Session 2005-06 (The Stationery Office 2006) para 2.14, the 
section 1 fraud offence is compliant with Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights.  
7 
 
criminalise ‘something as innocuous as failing to work for an employer as hard 
as one might’ using section 4.17  But where there is genuine scope for debate 
as to whether a defendant occupies a relevant position, and an element of 
dishonesty is present, it may be convincing for a judge to leave fraud by 
abuse of position to the jury for interrogation.  Moreover, if a judge takes a 
broad approach to what might in principle count as a ‘position’, it follows that 
the jury gets to make more of the decision based on dishonesty.18  There is a 
strong argument for this approach on the facts of Valujevs.  The defendants in 
Valujevs ought to have been licensed; the relevant licensing regime required 
the provision of certain basic conditions for workers, including over workers’ 
financial interests; and the defendants and migrant workers were not at arm’s 
length.  
 
The Court of Appeal overturned the trial judge.  In the circumstances of this 
case, fraud by abuse of position should be left to the jury.  Fulford L.J.’s 
conclusion was based on two factors.  First, it was important that the 
defendants had assumed responsibility for paying the workers what they were 
due, and that they had exercised control over what monies the workers were 
paid.  Where such responsibility and control is assumed, there is ‘a clear 
expectation that the worker will receive [wages] without a reduction in the form 
of (i) unwarranted financial penalties or deductions, (ii) unlawful demands for 
                                                                                                                                                              
This is because dishonesty is embedded ‘as an element in the definition of the offence’, and there is 
‘some identifiable morally dubious conduct to which the test of dishonesty may be applied’. 
17 D. Ormerod and D. Williams, Smith’s Law of Theft (OUP, 9th edn, 2007) 133. 
18 With thanks to my anonymous reviewer for this point. 
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the repayment of suggested fines, or (iii) artificially inflated rental payments’.19  
Secondly, even though the defendants operated as unlicensed gangmasters 
they should have been licensed (Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004, section 
4).  A gangmaster must adhere to the Gangmasters Licensing Standards 
2012.  These standards prohibit a gangmaster from withholding or threatening 
to withhold ‘the whole or part of any payment due to a worker for any work 
they have done’.20  The Court of Appeal stated that the standards set out in 
this document regarding the withholding of wages provided ‘vital context’.21  
On this basis too fraud by abuse of position should be left to the jury.   
 
However, the Court also affirmed Richardson J.’s concerns regarding 
commercial freedom.  According to Fulford L.J., the facts that the defendants 
charged excessive rent, withheld work, or lent money to ensure debt 
bondage, did not contribute to a case that the defendants held an expectation 
under section 4 of the Fraud Act.  The case for commercial freedom was 
tersely stated: ‘Section 4 does not apply to those who simply supply 
accommodation, goods, services or labour, whether on favourable or 
unfavourable terms and whether or not they have a strong bargaining 
position’.22  Individuals ‘are entitled to and expected to look after their own 
                                                        
19 n 4 above at [38]. 
20 Gangmasters Licensing Authority, Licensing Standards (May 2012) 15 < 
http://www.gla.gov.uk/PageFiles/956/Licensing%20Standards%20-%20May%202012.pdf>  accessed 
23 September 2015. 
21 n 4 above at [44]. 
22 ibid at [43]. 
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interests’. 23   One justification for this position was that gangmasters are 
‘entitled to ask for repayment of moneys that they have lent to workers’.24  
The next was that workers are also ‘able to look for accommodation or 
employment elsewhere’.25  Both reasons show little sympathy for the plight of 
vulnerable migrant workers.  It is the responsibility and control assumed by 
the unlicensed gangmasters in Valujevs, undertaken in the context of a 
relevant licensing regime which prohibits such conduct, which provided the 
basis for the successful appeal.   
 
Since the defendants had assumed the relevant responsibility and control in 
Valujevs, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge’s decision that there 
was no case to answer in relation to fraud by abuse of position.  Valujevs then 
went back to the Crown Court where Mr Valujevs and Mr Mezals were found 
not guilty of fraud by abuse of position.  I do not intend to explore the Crown 
Court’s subsequent decision in this note.  The focus here is upon the Court of 
Appeal’s reasoning as to why there was a case to answer regarding fraud by 
abuse of position.  We can agree with the Court of Appeal’s conclusion on the 
facts, but challenge its reasoning.  The focus here is upon three important 
issues.   
 
First, there is ambiguity in the ratio, encapsulated in the statement that: 
 
                                                        
23 ibid at [44]. 




[T]he critical factor in this case is that there is evidence that the defendants 
arguably assumed control of, and responsibility for, collecting the wages of 
the workers, or they controlled the wages at the moment that they were paid 
over, and the fact that they were acting as gangmasters merely provided the 
vital context relied on by the prosecution in which that role was assumed.26  
 
In particular, it is difficult to understand the relationship between assuming 
control of and responsibility for monies, and the Gangmasters Licensing 
Standards as merely providing ‘vital context’. 27   The duty not to withhold 
monies owed comes from the Licensing Standards.  Arguably the two criteria 
are inextricably linked.  Rather than being a mere background matter, the 
licensing regime in this case feeds directly into the selection of assumption of 
control of and responsibility for monies as the criteria for determining a 
position of trust.  The relationship between these two factors is not given 
rigorous analysis by the Court.   
 
It is apparent that a licensing regime which extends to only certain industries, 
and which sets out minimum labour standards, is driving judicial interpretation 
of a relevant position of trust.28  Here is the second point: this is a very 
unusual and restrictive reading of a relevant position of trust given (i) the 
scope of sections 1(2)(c) and 4 of the Fraud Act; and (ii) the facts of Valujevs.   
                                                        
26 ibid at [44]. 
27 ibid. 
28  For elaboration, see Gangmasters Licensing Authority, ‘Guidance on Who Needs a Licence’ 




As noted above, there is no indication in section 4 or in the Explanatory Notes 
to the Fraud Act that a position of trust should be interpreted restrictively.  
Nevertheless, there are powerful rule of law reasons to avoid over-extending 
the reach of fraud by abuse of position.  But it is hardly self-evident that 
assumption of responsibility or control over monies is necessary in order to 
have responsibility to safeguard, or not to act against, another person’s 
financial interests.  Identifying assumption of responsibility for or the exercise 
of control over wages as the justification for a position is to read a further 
requirement into section 4 of the Fraud Act.  This is no more likely to advance 
rule of law ideals.   
 
Fulford L.J. also stated that some reasons could not be used to find a relevant 
position: the charging of excessive rent; the withholding of work; the lending of 
money to ensure debt bondage; and circumstances of unequal bargaining 
power.  But these reasons are not necessarily contrary to sections 1(2)(c) and 
4 of the Fraud Act, and the accompanying Explanatory Notes.  For example, 
the scope of the negative aspect to the fraud by abuse of position offence 
(that the defendant is expected ‘not to act against’ another person’s financial 
interests) is entirely overlooked both by the trial judge and by the Court of 
Appeal in Valujevs.  Furthermore, the Explanatory Notes state that a relevant 
relationship may arise ‘in any context where the parties are not at arm’s 
length’, but this is directly at odds with the case for commercial freedom 
pursued by Fulford L.J..29  While we would expect there to be core examples 
                                                        
29 Law Commission, Fraud, n 1 above, para 7.38. 
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of a relevant position, there must also be cases which sit on the penumbra.  
Given that marginal cases will exist, Fulford L.J.’s brightline exclusion of these 
reasons, even within the specific context of unlicensed gangmasters, seems 
premature.  
 
Nor is this restrictive reading convincing on the facts of Valujevs.  If 
identification of control or responsibility over monies is an attempt to identify 
the strongest basis for a relevant position of trust, the point arises that there 
are other strong reasons for leaving fraud by abuse of position to a jury in 
cases involving vulnerable migrant workers.  Workers who are charged 
exorbitant rent or who are in debt bondage to intermediaries in the labour 
market are highly dependent upon those intermediaries.  Their status in the 
labour market is nothing short of precarious.  It is implausible that such 
individuals ‘are entitled to and expected to look after their own interests’, as 
Fulford L.J. suggests.30  From this position of precariousness, ought there not 
to be an expectation that the source of this status must safeguard, or not act 
against, the vulnerable party’s financial interests?  Notably the workers in 
Valujevs were migrant workers, and thus part of a group of individuals who 
labour lawyers have noted ‘are made particularly vulnerable by law’ itself.31  
Virginia Mantouvalou has identified ‘exclusion from labour inspections, 
minimum wage and maximum working hours’ legislation’ as examples of ways 
                                                        
30 n 4 above at [44]. 
31  V. Mantouvalou, ‘The Right to Non-Exploitative Work’ in The Right to Work: Legal and 
Philosophical Perspectives (Hart, 2014) 50. 
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in which the law creates vulnerability.32   Ought the criminal law to afford 
special protection using fraud by abuse of position to persons who are 
vulnerable to exploitation because of the rules of a legal system?  The 
concern is that the potential for the section 4 offence to be read in this way is 
significantly impeded by the reasoning in Valujevs. 
 
Valujevs is an important case notwithstanding this narrow interpretation of 
‘position’ because it prompts fresh debate about using section 4 of the Fraud 
Act 2006 to penalise exploitation.  This point is explored in my third point 
below.  But first it is key to note that this specific debate sits within a wider 
context of mapping the role of criminal law in penalising exploitation.  When 
and how ought the criminal law be used to penalise various types of 
exploitation of persons, such as sexual, labour, and financial exploitation?  
These are among the most pressing questions to be addressed by criminal 
law theorists.  Against a backdrop of significant public and political concern 
about exploitation in England and Wales, legal efforts to tackle exploitation 
have expanded, spanning across branches of the common law.  In July 2014 
the Supreme Court issued a bold decision in Hounga v Allen, blocking the 
application of the illegality doctrine in a case involving illegal work status.33  
According to the majority, using illegality to strike out Ms Hounga’s claim in 
tort law did not take into account the fact that she had been trafficked into the 
United Kingdom for the purposes of forced labour.  They argued that a 
‘prominent strain of current public policy against trafficking’ requires protection 
                                                        
32 ibid 50-51. 
33 [2014] UKSC 47. 
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of victims of human trafficking, and this might on occasion require that the 
illegality doctrine is itself bypassed.34  As noted by Alan Bogg and Sarah 
Green, this is a significant first step given that public policy usually operates to 
block a claim in tort or contract law.35   
 
Alongside willingness to reassess existing civil law and regulatory measures 
in the light of serious exploitation, there is mounting pressure to use coercive 
measures to penalise interpersonal exploitation.  One significant pressure 
point comes from international obligations.  In an important judgment in 
Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia, the European Court of Human Rights read into 
Article 4 of the European Convention of Human Rights a right not to be 
subjected to human trafficking. 36   Following Rantsev, it is now an open 
question as to which other ECHR rights ought to be read so as to protect 
individuals from serious interpersonal exploitation.  There is logical scope for 
Article 5 ECHR (the right to liberty) to be engaged in relation to labour 
exploitation, for example.  If a right protected by the ECHR is engaged, this 
begs the question as to what European human rights law requires of states.  
Strasbourg jurisprudence has developed so as to require effective criminal 
procedures and preventive measures in certain circumstances.37  In the last 
decade there has been a new emphasis on positive duties upon states to 
                                                        
34 ibid at [52]. 
35 See A. Bogg and S. Green, ‘Rights Are Not Just for the Virtuous: What Hounga Means for the 
Illegality Defence in the Discrimination Torts’ (2015) 44 ILJ 101, 110. 
36 (2010) 51 EHRR 1 [282]. 
37 Aydin v Turkey (1998) 25 EHRR 251; Osman v United Kingdom (2000) 29 EHRR 245. 
15 
 
create criminal law measures to ensure ECHR compliance.38  Another way of 
ensuring compliance with international and human rights documents is to use 
existing criminal law offences to penalise or to prevent exploitation.  In 
England and Wales there are a number of offences which can be read as 
tackling exploitation, but which are not advertised as exploitation statutes.  So 
one important part of this wider ‘mapping’ process is to ascertain whether the 
fraud by abuse of position offence ought to be read as a means of penalising 
some forms of exploitation, as has appealed to criminal law commentators.39   
 
However, the third point is that Valujevs is a sign that fraud by abuse of 
position will not do the work of penalising serious exploitation of persons.  
Judicial interpretation as to who has an expectation ‘to safeguard or not to act 
against’ the financial interests of another person presents a clear obstacle.  If 
section 4 is read against the context of a licensing standard which sets out 
minimum labour standards, as in Valujevs, it is rendered ineffective in 
targeting systemic labour exploitation.  But arguably there are also conceptual 
difficulties with using the section 4 offence in this way.  This complex topic 
cannot be pursued to a conclusion here, but, in the spirit of provoking debate, 
the following points are often overlooked by criminal law commentators who 
consider fraud by abuse of position a means of penalising exploitation.   
 
                                                        
38 Siliadin v France (2006) 43 EHRR 16.  For discussion, see A. Ashworth, ‘Human Rights and 
Positive Obligations to Create Particular Criminal Offences’ in A. Ashworth, Positive Obligations in 
Criminal Law (Hart, 2013).    
39 See n 3 above. 
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i. A position of safeguarding, or not acting against, another person’s financial 
interests is not necessarily anything to do with exploitation. It may be entirely 
random whether there is such a position in a case of interpersonal 
exploitation.  An exploiter may have only a fleeting encounter with an 
exploitee in temporal terms.  It would be difficult to argue that a door-to-door 
salesman who employs exploitative tactics is expected to safeguard a 
homeowner’s financial interests.  That would be to interpret even an 
admittedly vague idea of ‘position’ in section 4 to the point of absurdity.  
Similarly, it would be illogical to argue that a door-to-door salesman has a 
duty not to act against a homeowner’s financial interests given that they are 
strangers.   
 
ii. It is at least plausible to suggest that there is a relationship between 
vulnerable persons and core examples of serious interpersonal exploitation.  It 
is perfectly possible for an individual to seek to exploit a person simply 
because that person is vulnerable in relation to him (this being a subjective 
type of vulnerability). But what about the targeting of persons who are widely 
recognised as highly precarious members of the labour force (let us call them 
the objectively vulnerable, though this label is itself imperfect)?  There may be 
greater culpability here.  By dishonestly targeting an objectively vulnerable 
person, an exploiter hopes to gain easy advantage over this person, whether 
or not that advantage is played out in practice.  An individual is hoping that a 
vulnerable person is an ‘easy target’.  Beyond the greater likelihood that an 
exploiter succeeds in his goals, an objectively vulnerable person may be 
targeted because he is less likely to report his ill-treatment.  In the case of 
17 
 
undocumented migrant workers, this could be because of their precarious 
legal status.40  In relation to young children or the mentally disordered, there 
may be barriers to advancing their own interests and/or to reporting 
exploitation.  If this exploratory argument about vulnerable persons and 
serious exploitation is plausible, it is then worth noting that there is no obvious 
relationship between section 4 of the Fraud Act and vulnerability and/or 
vulnerable persons.  Moreover, identifying vulnerable migrant workers does 
not play into the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Valujevs.   
 
iii. We could conjecture that an exploiter’s targeting conduct is also significant 
in core cases of interpersonal exploitation. 41   If exploiters typically target 
already vulnerable persons (such as migrant workers) in order to gain access 
to opportunities to gain, it may only be subsequently that exploiters act 
fraudulently within the meaning of section 1 of the Fraud Act 2006.  Is it true 
that part of the gist of serious exploitation is not just that an exploiter has 
acted fraudulently in relation to an otherwise robust person? If the earlier 
‘targeting’ behavior also bears on the seriousness of the exploitative wrong, 
fraud by abuse of position is an imperfect tool to penalise the wrong because 
it glosses over this ‘targeting’ aspect. 
 
                                                        
40 Mantouvalou, n 31 above, 52. 
41 For example, ‘targeting’ conduct has been found to be key in cases of sexual exploitation of young 
persons.  For discussion of ‘localised grooming’, and the relevance of ‘targeting’, see Home Affairs 




Valujevs confirms the following: it is hardly self-evident that fraud by abuse of 
position can be used to penalise serious interpersonal exploitation.  Fresh 
debate about exploitation and property offences in English law is overdue.  
There are several neglected normative issues.  First, it is counterproductive to 
argue in favour of using fraud by abuse of position to penalise exploitation 
without first unpacking ‘exploitation’.  ‘Interpersonal exploitation’ is a complex 
umbrella term.  ‘Exploitation’ can and should be disaggregated into a number 
of distinct exploitative wrongs.  This reasoning is supported by the Court of 
Appeal’s judgment in R v SK: 
 
In the modern world exploitation can and does take place, in many different 
forms. Perhaps the most obvious is that in which one human being is treated 
by another as an object under his or her control for a sexual purpose. But 
‘slavery or servitude’ and ‘forced labour’ are not confined to exploitation of that 
sort.  One person may exploit another in many different ways.  Sexual 
exploitation is one, domestic servitude, […] another.42 
 
Only once a robust normative account of the type of exploitation in focus is 
presented, are the foundations laid for a principled discussion about 
criminalisation.  The following questions then move to the fore: ought the 
criminal law be used to penalise this type of exploitation, and, if so, how?  If 
criminalisation is justifiable we cannot expect an existing criminal law offence 
to have an exact fit with the contours of the exploitative wrong.  But it is 
                                                        
42 R v SK [2011] EWCA Crim 1691 [41]. 
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reasonable to ask whether current measures are justifiable.  Acknowledging 
the diversity and seriousness of interpersonal exploitation may require a more 
specific criminal law response than that provided by section 1(2)(c) of the 
Fraud Act, and one which marks out the particular blameworthiness of the 
exploitative wrongdoing.  
 
 
